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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
________________ 
No. 12-1932 
 
________________ 
JARON M. BREEN,  
 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
 
 
________________ 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-11-cv-05194) 
District Judge: Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin 
 
________________ 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 1, 2012 
 
Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO, and BARRY, 
 
Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: November 14, 2012 ) 
 
________________ 
OPINION 
 
________________ 
AMBRO, 
 
Circuit Judge 
Appellant Jaron M. Breen was denied income and benefits under the Social 
Security Act (“SSA”) by the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”).  Breen 
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sought review in the District Court, which entered an order affirming the Commissioner’s 
decision as supported by substantial evidence.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 
I. Background 
Pursuant to the SSA, Breen applied for Supplemental Security Income and Adult-
Child’s Disability Benefits (in December 2008 and April 2009, respectively) based on his 
diagnosed Asperger’s syndrome, an autism spectrum disorder. 
 After the state agency denied his benefits, Breen requested a hearing before an 
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).  At the hearing, Breen testified regarding his 
academic record and extracurricular activities, and both Breen and his father provided 
testimony regarding the difficulties and limitations Breen experienced due to his 
Asperger’s syndrome.  Breen also submitted several reports authored by psychologist 
Robert J. Rosenthal, Ph.D., who had been treating Breen for his Asperger’s syndrome 
since May 2006.  These reports included both Dr. Rosenthal’s opinions on areas in which 
Breen’s functional capacity was limited and Dr. Rosenthal’s assessment of challenges 
Breen was likely to face as he prepared for higher education and work.  The ALJ also 
heard from an independent vocational expert, who testified that (i) there were a number 
of jobs that could be performed by an individual with Breen’s age, education, past work 
history, and functional limitations, and (ii) were available in significant numbers in both 
the regional and national economies.1
                                              
1 We note the vocational expert’s testimony regarding jobs Breen could perform 
contained certain errors, i.e., he provided an arguably incomplete description of the 
position and requirements of a laundry worker job and incorrectly cited a bench worker 
job as an “SVP 2” while the correct designation is an “SVP 3.”  Because the expert’s 
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In March 2010, the ALJ issued a decision denying Breen’s application.  The ALJ 
found that while Breen had the severe impairment of Asperger’s syndrome, the record 
evidence and hearing testimony established that he retained the residual functional 
capacity to perform the type of limited work and representative occupations described by 
the vocational expert, thus concluding that Breen was not disabled within the meaning of 
the SSA because he could perform a significant number of jobs in the economy.  Breen 
then petitioned the Appeals Council, which denied review and thus made the ALJ’s 
decision the final decision of the Commissioner.  See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106–07 
(2000); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.955(b), 404.981, 422.210(a). 
 Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Breen sought review of the 
Commissioner’s final decision in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).  On cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the District Court entered judgment for the Commissioner, finding the ALJ’s 
decision was supported by substantial evidence.  This timely appeal followed. 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
                                                                                                                                                  
testimony was accurate as to the hand packer job—with respect to both the position’s 
requirements and Breen’s abilities to perform such work—and he indicated there were 
2,000 and 100,000 such positions regionally and nationally, respectively, such errors are 
immaterial.  See Craigie v. Bowen, 835 F.2d 56, 58 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding 200 jobs in 
the regional economy was “a clear indication that there exists in the national economy 
other substantial gainful work”); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566(b), 416.966(b) (explaining work 
exists in the national economy when there is a significant number of jobs in one or more 
occupations which an individual can perform). 
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 “Like the District Court, we must uphold a final agency determination unless we 
find that it is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.”  Rutherford v. 
Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005).  “Substantial evidence is ‘more than a mere 
scintilla.  It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 
to support a conclusion.’”  Mercy Home Health v. Leavitt, 436 F.3d 370, 380 (3d Cir. 
2006) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). 
III. Discussion 
 The SSA authorizes the Commissioner to pay benefits to disabled persons.  42 
U.S.C. §§ 423, 1382.  It defines “disability” as “inability to engage in any substantial 
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment 
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for 
a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”  Id. § 423(d)(1)(A).  An individual 
cannot engage in “substantial gainful activity” if he “cannot, considering his age, 
education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work 
which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether . . . a specific job vacancy 
exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.”  Id. § 423(d)(2)(A). 
The Commissioner applies a five-step test to determine whether a claimant is 
disabled.  20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).  In the first four steps, which are 
not at issue in this case, the Commissioner considers the medical severity of the 
claimant’s impairments and determines his residual functional capacity.  See Poulos v. 
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Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 91–92 (3d Cir. 2007).2
Breen contests the ALJ’s fifth-step determination that he could perform a 
significant number of jobs in the economy, arguing that the residual functional capacity 
found by the ALJ failed adequately to consider Breen and his father’s testimony and 
misapplied Dr. Rosenthal’s assessments, and that the vocational expert’s testimony is not 
“substantial evidence.”  We find these arguments unavailing, as our review of the record 
establishes that the ALJ gave appropriate consideration to the hearing testimony, the 
reports of Dr. Rosenthal, and the vocational expert’s opinion in reaching a residual 
functional capacity finding that took into account Breen’s pace, functional, and social 
limitations. 
  At the fifth step, the burden 
shifts to the Commissioner to show “that the claimant is able to perform work available 
in the national economy.”  Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).  To meet this 
burden, “[t]he ALJ must show there are . . . jobs existing in significant numbers in the 
national economy which the claimant can perform, consistent with h[is] medical 
impairments, age, education, . . . and residual functional capacity.”  Plummer v. Apfel, 
186 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 1999). 
First, the ALJ accepted Breen and his father’s testimony as credible, noting 
Breen’s college attendance, good grades in challenging courses, and participation in a 
number of social activities.  The ALJ further considered Breen’s own perception of his 
social and academic-related shortcomings, as well as his father’s impression of Breen’s 
                                              
2 Because Breen has never engaged in “substantial gainful activity,” he has no past 
relevant work and, therefore, is deemed to have satisfied his burden of establishing a 
prima facie case of disability.  See Markle v. Barnhart, 324 F.3d 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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limitations.  The ALJ’s consideration of Breen’s testimony regarding his school 
attendance and activities as one probative factor in the disability determination was 
proper.  See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3).  And, as recognized by the 
District Court, there is no evidence in the record to support Breen’s contention that the 
ALJ took comments out of context or distorted his and his father’s offered testimony. 
Nor does the record indicate the ALJ misapplied Dr. Rosenthal’s opinions.  The 
final responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity is reserved 
to the Commissioner, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1546(c), 416.946(c), and on such issues even 
“treating source opinions . . . are never entitled to controlling weight or special 
significance,” SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183 (July 2, 1996).3
                                              
3 While treating medical source opinions may be afforded controlling weight on issues 
such as the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairment, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2), 
opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner—i.e., a claimant’s residual functional 
capacity—are not entitled to “any special significance” regardless of the source of the 
opinion, id. (d)(2)–(3). 
  Nonetheless, the ALJ 
thoroughly discussed and properly evaluated Dr. Rosenthal’s reports and afforded his 
views significant weight.  Regarding the functional capacity assessments, the ALJ 
accounted for Breen’s limitations by making a residual functional capacity finding that 
Breen could work in jobs that were self-paced, involved simple tasks and few changes, 
and required only minimal interaction with others.  The ALJ also considered Dr. 
Rosenthal’s educational evaluation, and noted the ultimate recommendation that Breen 
seek job training clearly indicated Dr. Rosenthal believed Breen was, in fact, capable of 
working. 
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Finally, the ALJ’s reliance on the testimony of the vocational expert was 
appropriate and provided adequate evidence to support the conclusion Breen could 
perform jobs significantly available in the economy.  Breen’s critique of the ALJ’s 
hypothetical question on which the expert based his testimony is unpersuasive, as we 
conclude the ALJ satisfied the requirement that the hypothetical question here includes 
consideration of all credibly established functional limitations.  See Plummer, 186 F.3d at 
431.  Breen’s assertion that he lacks the necessary judgment to perform the unskilled 
occupations identified by the vocational expert is similarly unconvincing, both because 
the expert indicated that only minimal judgment was required to perform those jobs and 
because Breen’s ability to excel in challenging college courses undermines such a claim. 
After considering the evidence, the ALJ ultimately determined that Breen could 
perform work in the national economy despite his impairment, and thus had failed to 
establish he was disabled within the meaning of the SSA.  While Breen claims to attack 
the ALJ’s decision based on legal error, in reality he simply appears to disagree with the 
ALJ’s assessment of the evidence and her determination based on that evidence.  The 
question before us, however, is not whether we agree with the ALJ’s decision but rather 
whether there was substantial evidence to support it.  We conclude that there was, and 
thus the Commissioner satisfied his burden at step five of the disability determination.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
